Institutional entrepreneurs as translators : a comparative study in an emerging activity. by Huault, Isabelle et al.
   XV
ème Conférence Internationale de Management Stratégique, Annecy / Genève 13-16 Juin 2006 
INSTITUTIONAL ENTREPRENEURS AS COMPETING 
TRANSLATORS: 





International Centre for Corporate Social Responsibility 




International Centre for Corporate Social Responsibility 
Nottingham University Business School 
 
Frédérique Déjean 
Maître de Conférences 




DRM-DMSP, Université Paris Dauphine 
 
Correspondance :  
Bernard Leca 
Nottingham University Business School 
Jubilee Campus, Wollaton Road 
Nottingham, NG8 1BB, UK 
Tel: +44 (0) 115 9515261 




This paper analyzes the reasons why some institutional entrepreneurship strategies failed to 
translate an institution while other succeeded, by paying a specific attention to the interaction 
between material and discursive dimensions in the translation process. A theoretical 
framework integrating both dimensions of translation is first proposed in order to study 
strategies of competing entrepreneurs. Then a comparative study of three entrepreneurs 
translating practices of corporate social evaluation in the French context is used to investigate 




Institutional Entrepreneur – Translation – Corporate Social Evaluation    XV
ème Conférence Internationale de Management Stratégique, Annecy / Genève 13-16 Juin 2006 
INSTITUTIONAL ENTREPRENEURS AS COMPETING 
TRANSLATORS: 





This paper analyzes the reasons why some institutional entrepreneurship strategies failed to 
translate an institution while other succeeded, by paying a specific attention to the interaction 
between material and discursive dimensions in the translation process. A theoretical 
framework integrating both dimensions of translation is first proposed in order to study 
strategies of competing entrepreneurs. Then a comparative study of three entrepreneurs 
translating practices of corporate social evaluation in the French context is used to investigate 




Institutional Entrepreneur – Translation – Corporate Social Evaluation 
 
  2   XV
ème Conférence Internationale de Management Stratégique, Annecy / Genève 13-16 Juin 2006 
 
INSTITUTIONAL ENTREPRENEURS AS COMPETING TRANSLATORS: 
A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN THE EMERGING ACTIVITY 
OF CORPORATE SOCIAL EVALUATION IN FRANCE 
 
Moving beyond the deterministic view of traditional institutional research, works on 
institutional entrepreneurs try to understand how actors are able to envision and implement 
new institutions while remaining in the tenets of institutional theory (DiMaggio, 1988; 
Fligstein, 1997). Authors investigate the enabling conditions for actors to become institutional 
entrepreneurs and the process through which they develop their strategies (e.g. Dorado, 2005; 
Garud et al., 2002; Greenwood et al., 2002). However, as this field of research is still very 
recent there are some important shortcomings. In this paper we would like to address two of 
them: the lack of comparative analysis between success and failure of institutional 
entrepreneurs, and the underestimation of the material dimension of the institutional 
entrepreneurship’s strategy. 
First, researches on institutional entrepreneurs only treated cases where institutional 
entrepreneurs succeeded in their attempts to develop and implement institutional change.  
Hence, the reasons why institutional entrepreneurs fail to implement an institutional change 
remain unexplored. Undersampling of failure is a current bias in management studies 
(Denrell, 2003), yet this is especially embarrassing when studying institutional 
entrepreneurship as failure is a situation that is likely to be much more common than success 
(DiMaggio, 1988). Thus, a central question remains largely unexplored: Why do some 
institutional entrepreneurs succeed while others fail? We suggest that in order to advance on 
this issue we must develop comparative process studies between the strategies of institutional 
entrepreneurs who succeed and of those who fail. To the best of our knowledge no such 
comparative study has yet been done. 
Second, actual research tends to concentrate its efforts exclusively on the discursive 
aspect of institutional entrepreneurship (e.g. Munir & Phillips, 2005; Phillips, Lawrence & 
Hardy, 2004). Phillips et al., (2004) suggest that institutional entrepreneurs can be defined as 
generators of influential texts that are aimed at influencing the nature and structure of 
discourses. Such an emphasis might underestimate the material dimension of institutional 
entrepreneurship which is rarely analyzed (with the exception of Hargadon & Douglas, 2001). 
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In order to advance research on those two points we develop a comparative analysis of 
the ways through which three competing institutional entrepreneurs tried to institutionalize in 
France different visions of corporate social evaluation by creating new criteria and tools. 
Social evaluation consists in providing extra financial information on corporations to 
stakeholders such as investors or consumers. This includes, but is not limited to, information 
on environmental policies and practices, employees’ relations, community involvement, or 
suppliers and consumers relations. This practice was brought to France by different 
institutional entrepreneurs (Déjean et al., 2004) who drew from practices in the United States 
where it first emerged (Domini, 1992; Férone et al., 2001; Vogel, 1978), interpreted them in 
different competing fashions and tried to impose their view. 
Such a translation is a common strategy for institutional entrepreneurs who draw from 
practices or beliefs that they found in other settings and strategically translate them in a focal 
field to serve their interests and values (e.g. Dorado, 2005; Fligstein, 2001: Greenwood, 
Suddaby & Hinings, 2002). What is especially interesting with translation is  that it has been 
considered both as a discursive and as a material process. On the one hand, recent institutional 
works focused on the discursive dimension (e.g. Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996; Sahlin-
Andersson, 1996). On the other hand, the ‘sociology of translation’ – a part of actor network 
theory (Czarniawska and Hernes, 2005) – is focused on the material aspects to analyze how 
translators develop devices and organize heterogeneous networks of human and non-human 
actors to support the institutional change (e.g. Callon, 1986a). 
Authors acknowledge that both dimensions and approaches are complementary (e.g. 
Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996; Czarniawska & Hernes, 2005; Latour, 2003). However an 
integrative framework combining those two approaches is yet to be developed. Such an 
integrative framework would allow fostering our understanding of institutional entrepreneurs’ 
strategies as both discursive and material. Moreover, that framework would contribute to 
account for the role of the articulation between those two dimensions in the institutional 
entrepreneurs’ strategies and to which extend this might explain their success and/or failure. 
This leads us to provide two main insights in this paper. First, drawing from previous 
literature, we provide a twofold framework of the translation process, combining discursive 
and material dimensions. Second, we use this framework to conduct a comparative analysis of 
institutional entrepreneurs’ strategies and by doing intend to advance in the analysis of what 
makes an institutional entrepreneur successful or not. 
This paper is divided in four sections. In a first part, drawing from previous literature we 
develop an integrative framework combining discursive and more material dimensions to 
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analyze the translation process and the way institutional entrepreneurs’ conduct it. The second 
part introduces our data and method. In a third part we use this framework to empirically 
analyze how competing institutional entrepreneurs manage this translation process in the 
emerging activity of corporate social evaluation. The fourth part is used to discuss how the 
analysis of the institutional entrepreneurs’ strategies during the different steps of the 
translation process can account for their success or failure to impose their approach as 
dominant. 
 
AN INTEGRATIVE FRAMEWORK TO STUDY TRANSLATION 
 
Translation is the process through which practices and beliefs are modified as they 
diffuse across organizational fields (Boxenbaum, 2005). It is a process of “transformation, 
modification, change, renovation, and identity construction - a blending of the foreign and the 
local, the new and the old” (Tsui-Auch, 2001: 719). Several authors have recently used the 
notion of translation to better understand institutional innovation and change by strategically 
oriented actors (e.g. Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996; Sahlin-Andersson, 1996; Saka, 2004). 
Strategically managed by an institutional entrepreneur, translation is used to transpose in the 
focal field, practices or beliefs in which the institutional entrepreneur see an opportunity to 
realize interest that he values highly. 
This translation process is twofold. Institutional entrepreneurs develop discursive 
strategies to present the translated institution in such a way that it resonates better with the 
existing practices in the focal setting and so favor its acceptation and implementation (e.g. 
Boxenbaum, 2005; Campbell & Pedersen, 2001; Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996; Greenwood, 
Suddaby & Hinings, 2002). Yet, most of those works only focus on the discursive strategies 
of the actors who translate the institutions from one setting to another. While this 
discursive/symbolic dimension is central in recent works on institutional change (e.g. 
Philipps, Lawrence & Hardy, 2004), authors suggest that this should be combine with taken 
into account of real/material dimensions to better seize the institutional change process (e.g. 
Fairclough, 2005; Lounsbury & Ventresca, 2003). The idea here is that discourse analysis can 
only tell part of the story and that more material aspects should be considered as well. The 
discourse analysis can only tell part of the story and more material aspects should be 
considered as well, as suggested by the actor network theory (Latour, 1993, 2003). Agents’ 
actions are not viewed as aligning on general pre-existing cultural and cognitive frames but 
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rather as developing and stabilizing heterogeneous networks of human and non-human actors 
to support the institutional change (e.g. Callon, 1986a; Harrisson & Laberge, 2002). 
Thus, by combining both approaches, we develop an integrative framework that 
considers the discursive and the material dimensions of the translation process. This 
integrative framework allows deciphering six steps in the translation process: 
decontextualization, problematization, construction of an interessement system, embodiement, 
research of the support of allies and stabilization of the network. 
 
Decontextualization 
The translation process starts with the decontextualization of the institution from its 
context. Institutional entrepreneurs identify an institution in local settings. They see in these 
institutions, if translated into another setting, an opportunity to realize interest that they value 
highly. To be decontextualized, an institution must be disembodied from its local carriers. To 
do so, institutional entrepreneurs interpret and transform the models, linking them to a more 
general and simpler account (Sahlin-Andersson, 1996). This simplified institution becomes a 
translocal idea, i.e. an idea “floating in the translocal organizational thought-worlds” 
(Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996: 16), until it is re-embodied in another local setting. This 
decontextualization can also have a material dimension as documented by Callon (1986a) 
who shows how scallops are brought from Japan to St. Brieuc as part of a translation project 
to adapt Japanese techniques of scallops’ raising in France. 
Then, these institutional entrepreneurs must re-embed the idea within the focal setting 
where they want to implement it. Czarniawska and Joerges (1996) insist on the double 
dimension of this re-embeddedness which includes interpretation – i.e. aligning the new idea 
with words, values and symbols that already exist in the focal setting, and materialization – 
i.e. the enactment of that new idea through discursive and material arrangements.  
 
Problematization 
Drawing from the initial model and the local conditions, the institutional entrepreneur 
must develop a coherent project. This is done through problematization i.e. the definition of a 
local problem to be solved (Callon, 1986). The institutional entrepreneur defines the main 
groups of potential allies that they want to target and elaborates the problematization 
accordingly. Defining these main groups implies to identify the actors whose support is likely 
to help the institutionalization of the project. Then, problematization is developed to convince 
them. Sahlin-Andersson (1996) suggests that entrepreneurs must set a logic linking causes to 
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effects to present the translated idea. The story will present the problem and the solution. The 
concepts must be presented in a rational way, defining and explaining causal relations. 
Typically a problem solving logic is included, identifying a troublesome situation in the local 
field and explaining how the project can solve it (Buhr and Grafström, 2004; Frenkel, 2005). 
The logic developed by the entrepreneur is presented as offering a solution to this concrete 
problem. The institutional entrepreneur tries to presents its solution as an obligatory passage 
point (OPP) for those potential allies (Callon, 1986b).  
 
Interessement systems 
The development of interessement systems by the institutional entrepreneurs considers a 
distinct, yet related step. The aim here is to make the project appealing within the focal field 
to attract support. The entrepreneur must convince the actors of the focal field that this project 
will benefit them. The idea will be edited according to the focal setting’s institutional 
arrangements (Sahlin-Andersson, 1996). A good fit with local institutional arrangements 
increases the chance of successful institutionalization (Hargadon and Douglas, 2001). The 
institutional entrepreneur must perform some editing to adapt the transposed model in the new 
setting. Editing aims at convincing other actors to take part in the reform (Czarniawska, 
1990). A discursive strategy is to formulate the concepts in the local settings so that they “tell 
a good story” (Sahlin-Andersson, 1996: 87) – i.e. in such a way that they would attract 
attention. Some elements can be overemphasized and dramatized to convince local actors. 
Interessement systems aim at convincing the actors that they have an interest in cooperating to 
the institutionalization of the new practice. To do so, institutional entrepreneurs develop 
reward systems, providing the potential allies with the hope of rewards if they support the 
translated institution (Callon, 1986a).   
 
Embodiment 
Problematization and interessement aim at presenting the supported solution. This 
solution is embodied in inscription devices in which the problematization and reward systems 
are materialized. Inscription devices embody the institutionalization project and reduce the 
range of possible discussion (Latour and Woolgar, 1979). These material artifacts will 
stabilize the problematization and the rewards and diffuse them. Projects, norms, tentative 
templates put down what are the issues and the solution considered. If one is to accept the 
device, s/he will agree to discuss within the limits of this artifact and is less likely to put the 
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very logic of the artifact into question. Furthermore, if the artifact travels, it carries its logic 
along without changes. 
 
Support of allies 
The next step is where allies bring their support. This is the moment where other actors 
will give their consent to the project or at least will conform to it. The problematization and 
the interessement system set by the institutional entrepreneur will resonate for them. They 
will support the discourse developed by the institutional entrepreneur and adopt the 
inscription devices that embody it. A network of supporters emerges that backs up the project 
(Callon, 1986a). Inscription devices work as intermediaries – i.e. "anything passing between 
actors who define the relationship between them" (Callon: 1991: 134) in the network. They 
diffuse the project. If the institutional entrepreneur considers that a sufficient group of actors 
fail to give their support, the entrepreneur can negotiate with potential allies. The entrepreneur 
can negotiate about the problematization or interestment systems (e.g. Fligstein, 1997, 2001; 
Rao, 1998) as well as about the inscription devices (Callon, 1986a) with potential allies to 
rally them. 
 
Stabilization of the network 
The last step of the translation process is the stabilization of the network. When reaching 
this step, the network of supporters acquires a relative stability. Actors in the network gain a 
feeling of identity from their belonging to the network (Callon, 1986a). As such it goes 
beyond the problematization which is a simple unstable conjecture. Interested actors become 
spokesmen who speak not only for themselves but for the group they represent. 
Representation is concentrated in few hands. While every actor is an intermediary (Callon, 
1991), the number of spokesmen remains limited. Spokesmen allow to reduce the number of 
representatives and then to stabilize the network. Chains of spokesmen then are constituted. 
Eventually the entrepreneur might become the spokesman for the whole community of 
enrolled actors. Hence a constraining network of heterogeneous humans and non humans is 
organized. At this step the new institution will either tend to become irreversible or fail. This 
can be measured by convergence – i.e. “the extent to which the process of translation and its 
circulation of intermediaries leads to agreement” (Callon, 1991: 144). The network begins to 
be perceived as a macro-actor (Czarniawska & Sevon, 1996: 7). 
Several authors suggest that the institutional entrepreneur has reached its aim and must 
be considered as successful when s/he has created such a specific domain where actors share a 
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common identity (Rao, Monin and Durand, 2003; Rao, Morrill and Zald, 2000; Durand and 
McGuire, 2005). 
 
Although these steps can be analytically deciphered they might overlap in time since 
they are very much linked to each other. For examples, the translocal idea which is 
disembedded from its local context will be re-embedded in the problematization, 
interessement build on problematization and the support of allies is made easier to reach by a 
successful interessement system. Hence, rather than a strictly linear process, this is a sliding 
process. The figure 1 above shows this sliding process.  
 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
Our integrative translation model will allow analyze how the institutional entrepreneurship 
process develops through the six steps. 
 
Research questions 
The aim of this paper is to explore the reasons why do some institutional entrepreneurs 
succeed while others fail, taking the example of translation’s strategies. The integrative 
framework of the translation process that we elaborated allows to better specify and to better 
track the institutional entrepreneurship process. In the translation’s process, several strategies 
can be displayed by institutional entrepreneurs to manage this process in a way that they deem 
to be appropriate and aligned on their interests. It also suggests research questions to better 
specify our research. 
First, we need to investigate consider the articulation of the discursive and material 
dimensions of the institutional entrepreneurs’ strategies influence the institutionalization of 
their project. Many works have investigated the institutionalization process by institutional 
entrepreneurs mainly as a discursive process. While we suggested that considering the 
material dimension is necessary, we remained open to the possibility that bringing the 
material dimension in might not provide new insights and that everything can be analyzed 
through discourse analysis. Hence we had to investigate further the relationship between 
discursive and material dimensions, and the way institutional entrepreneurs manage this 
articulation, in the institutionalization process.  
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Q1: Does the way institutional entrepreneurs articulate the discursive and material 
dimensions accounts for the institutionalization of their project? 
 
While the institutional entrepreneurs’ success is largely related to the institutionalization 
of their project, other dimensions might be considered as well. Institutional entrepreneurship 
is also a way to reorganize power in a field and obtain some benefits from the new 
institutional arrangement. Authors increasingly indicate that institutional entrepreneurs are not 
just altruistic actors. Phillips et al. (2000) suggest that institutional change also leads to a shift 
of power within the field. Institutional entrepreneurs are likely to strategically manage the 
institutional change in order to improve their position in the field and increase their power 
(e.g. DiMaggio, 1991; Leblebici et al. 1991). In this view, the emphasis by the sociology of 
translation on the interest for the translator to become an obligatory passage point (Callon 
1986a and b) within the heterogeneous network to increase its power might be especially 
interesting. Callon indicates that securing such a position is a excellent way to ensure a 
sustainable power. Thus, becoming an OPP can arguably be considered as a factor of success 
for institutional entrepreneurs. Hence, this raises the question on how the discursive and 
material dimensions interact in the creation and development of such a position. 
Q2: Does the way institutional entrepreneurs articulate the discursive and material 
dimensions accounts for the improvement of their positions? 
 
CASE DESCRIPTION AND METHODOLOGY 
 
This article is based on a longitudinal qualitative study of the emerging activity of social 
evaluation of the companies in France from the mid-1990’s to 2002. Our aim is to contribute 
to theory development by providing a more integrated view of the translation process, and by 
using it to develop a comparative longitudinal study of institutional entrepreneurs’ strategies 
in order to gain some insights on what are the factors of success in this kind of strategic 
processes. Qualitative research is well suited when considering emerging fields where links 
among actors are still ill-structured (e.g. Garud, Jain, & Kumaraswamy, 2002; Lawrence, 
1999; Maguire, Hardy and Lawrence, 2004). Furthermore, Lee indicates that qualitative 
research is appropriate when "(a) contextualization, (b) vivid description, (c) dynamic (and 
possible causal) structuring of the organizational member's socially constructed world, and (d) 
the worldviews of the people under study" (1999: 43) are important. Those points are central 
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when investigating translation and institutional entrepreneurship processes which is the case 
here. 
 
Context and organizations sample 
We develop a comparative analysis of three institutional entrepreneurs’ strategies 
aiming to translate the similar concept of corporate social evaluation in the French context. 
That specific context has been selected for several reasons. First, it allows inter-
organizational comparison, since several actors tried to construct organizations providing non 
financial data on corporate performance during the late 1990. Second, three of these actors 
have effectively realized parallel works of translation, by relying on previous analysis of that 
activity in other cultural contexts (especially in US) before importing these practices in 
France. Third, that context is especially suitable to test our research questions since some of 
these organizations failed to establish the new practice while other succeeded, at least 
temporarily. 
 
The field of corporate social evaluation overlaps several markets. One of them is 
constituted by the main outlets of these non financial data: the industry of Socially 
Responsible Investment (SRI). That industry encompasses investors of the financial place 
trying to include in their investment criteria related to corporate social and / or environmental 
performance, beyond purely financial information. That activity emerged originally in the 
United States before diffusing all over the world (see Vogel, 1978, 2005). Models of social 
evaluation developed in the United States have been widely translated in other countries such 
as Nederland (Louche, 2004), Canada, Denmark (Boxenbaum, 2005) or France (Déjean et al., 
2004). 
The three organizations compared in the French context of social evaluation are the 
following: 
  The Centre Français d’Information sur les Entreprises (CFIE – French Center 
for Information on the Companies), founded in 1996 to foster social and 
environmental progress. It produced detailed monographies on companies; 
  The Agence de Rating Environnemental et Social des Entreprises (ARESE – 
Environmental and social rating agency), incorporated in 1997.  It provided 
measured corporate social evaluation to socially responsible fund managers; 
  Founded in 2000, the Observatoire de l’Ethique (ODE) appears to be the third 
institutional entrepreneur. That spin off of the Cercle Ethique des Affaires was 
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founded in 1993 to develop ethics in companies and help those willing to engage in 
this way, the ODE developed two activities. It proposed companies ethical and 
social evaluations for consumers as well as ‘customized’ corporate social evaluation 
for ethical fund managers. 
 
The annexe 1 offers an overview of each organization, through extracts from a guide 
(ORSE, 2001) produced by a French association to facilitate comparisons between organisms 
providing social evaluation. That presentation is interesting since it is based on self reports by 
organizations appearing in the guide. The results of those companies’ strategies are highly 
contrasted. As stated by the financial daily newspaper La Tribune (2002), Arese can be 
considered as the main French player in the sector, whereas the CFIE and the ODE are less 
important actors. Those very different results suggest that comparing their strategies of 
translation can provide some insights on the reasons why some institutional entrepreneurs 
succeed and others fail. 
 
Data Collection 
A total of 60 semi-structured interviews were conducted, taped and transcribed from 
2000 to 2005. Among those 60 interviews, 21 were realized with persons who participated to 
the creation or development of ARESE, the CFIE and the ODE, and 30 with socially 
responsible (SR) fund managers and executives involved in this activity in banks. Executives 
working in the investors relations of major French companies and consultants specialized in 
social responsibility, sustainable development and SRI were interviewed as well to obtain the 
most complete view of the emergence of social evaluation in France. This allowed us to gain 
an in depth knowledge of this field and to compare and contrast the different positions of 
different actors in order to obtain a triangulated cross-section, thereby providing a certain 
degree of control over results by widening the range of data sources. Those interviews lasted 
from 30 minutes to 4 hours. All the main executives of ARESE, the CFIE and the ODE were 
interviewed during at last 1 and an half hour. Analysis of several secondary sources 
comprising a series of internal archives and press articles was performed. Through these 
documents, we were able to reconstitute events, within the context of a procedural analysis.  
 
Data analysis 
Data analysis has been conducted in three steps, mobilizing various strategies to make 
sense of these processes data, such as the narrative strategy and/or grounded theory strategy 
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(Langley, 1999). The whole pattern of translations emerged from a progressive interpretation 
of the data. 
First, we organized the material (interviews and secondary data) in order to produce a 
"facts database" for each organization (Yin, 1989). That database chronicles the key facts 
related to the emergence and the institutionalization of each organization and is based on 
verbatim and/or secondary data collected through various sources (press articles, interviews, 
internet presentation of the organization, guides on organization providing social 
evaluation…). 
Second, by using these raw data, we were able to construct “stories” and a narrative for 
each of the three organizations and to analyze the work of translation realized by the 
entrepreneurs through the lens of the consolidated translation framework. In order to increase 
the validity and the consistency of our interpretation, one researcher was accountable for the 
description of the translation made by each organization, checking for the whole coherence of 
the process. 
Third, the interpreted data have been reorganized in order to compare each stage of the 
translation process for all three entrepreneurs and to facilitate the understanding of 
commonalities and differences in the work of translation operated by the these actors. During 
that process, and for all three organizations, the researcher in charge of a given organization 
verifies the whole coherence of the analysis concerning that organization. Finally three of the 
researchers checked the validity of the interpretation for the six stages, for each organization. 
We present the evolution of the process in successive steps, in accordance with our 
research model. 
 
COMPARING TRANSLATIONS OF COMPETING ENTREPRENEURS IN THE 
FRENCH SOCIAL EVALUATION FIELD 
 
Decontextualization 
Analyzing the local models from which the three institutional entrepreneurs draw shows 
that corporate social evaluation in the United States is a diversified practice. Moreover, 
entrepreneurs tend to mix these models with other ones provided by non US organizations 
having already translated US practices. 
Pierre Cadet, the founder of the ODE acknowledges to have been highly influenced by 
the CEP (Council on Economic Priorities). That American nonprofit public interest 
organization has been founded by Alice Tepper Marlin in 1969 to provide research on 
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corporate social responsibility. Its purpose is to analyze impartially the records of corporation 
and to make that information available to a wide range of actors (consumers, investors, 
businesses, and policy maker). Pierre Cadet was also in contact with EIRIS (Ethical 
Investment Research Service Ltd.). EIRIS is an English organization founded in 1983 to help 
Methodist churches and associations to apply their ethical principles to investment through 
the use of negative screening (i.e. rejection of corporation which are implied in activities 
considered as non ethical such as alcoholism or tobacco). The translocal idea that Pierre Cadet 
drew from these American and English experiences was the need to increase ethics of French 
managers through the diffusion of information on corporate ethics to a large public.  Such an 
approach appeared to him as being the most likely to increase managers' ethical awareness. 
Geneviève Férone, ARESE's founder and former CEO, has also been inspired by 
organizations she observed prior to the creation of ARESE. Previously a consultant in the US 
during the early 1990's, she analyzed the functioning of the whole chain of social investment 
and had been convinced that models based on religious, racial or consumerist leverages for 
action were simply "not exportable" elsewhere, especially not in France. However, she 
realized that the idea of providing social and environmental information to investors was a 
"good leverage" and could be used "to do something in France". The research provider KLD 
(Kinder Lyndenberg and Domini), offering quantified social and environmental information 
on US corporations, was perceived by Férone as a credible actor. When she travelled in 
Europe to analyze the potential market for a social evaluation agency, she has also been 
influenced by Pier Giovanni, the creator of Centre Info. Centre Info is an organization based 
in Switzerland that provides local pension funds with quantified information on social and 
environmental corporate performance in a very rational and business like way. She rejected 
the ethical approach of EIRIS, considered as a model "from the past" (see Férone et al., 2001). 
The translocal idea she retained from these experiences was to create a business focused on 
non-financial information taking place on the financial market. 
Martial Cozette, CFIE’s founder has never been to the United States to meet social 
rating agencies but he was quiet aware of their existence. His perception of the various actors 
is differentiated. Whereas he criticized the model of KLD, his view of the work done by the 
IRRC (Interfaith Responsibility Research Center) is really positive. Founded in 1972 during 
the Viet Nam war, that organization promotes constructive engagement towards companies, 
also called shareholders activism, by providing proxy research and analysis. As stated in their 
website, “the IRRC’s founding can be traced to a protest of the Vietnam War that triggered a 
rules change enabling stockholders to vote for the first time on shareholders proposals with 
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social connotations” (IRCC’s website). The translocal idea he drew from that example was 
that providing information on non financial dimensions could be a form of activism helpful to 
promote social and environmental concerns in companies. 
 
At this stage each institutional entrepreneur is inspired by different embodied 
realizations located in US and/or in Europe. They have already started a work of translation 
by reinterpreting the logic inherent to the model on which they were focused on and through 
the translation of that interpretation into a translocal idea. The table 1 contrasts the outcomes 
of that decontextualization process for the three organizations. That "translocal idea" needs 
now to be formulated in a way congruent with the context of importation, a process which 
occurs through problematization. 
 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Problematization 
If the three organizations share the will to provide social and environmental information 
about corporations, they clearly differentiated in their way of setting the problem. 
In 2000, Pierre Cadet founded the ODE to evaluate the non financial performances of 
companies. The rationale was the existence of an urgent need for more ethics in French 
corporations. He considers that on the topic of sustainable development, France is 10 years 
late compared to the Anglo-Saxon world and 5 or 6 compared to Scandinavian countries or 
Japan. To catch up, there was a need for an organization that would analyze companies and 
provide data. The aim would not be to stigmatize companies but rather to help them without 
judging them. It opposes the financial analysts’ methods as well as ARESE methods. Pierre 
Cadet states that nothing allows a group of experts to judge a company, considering that the 
experts of the group might change, and that criteria are not stable from one year to the next 
one. The solution was rather to be found in the development of an analysis system that would 
not deliver a judgment and avoid standardization. The ODE managers decided to focus on two 
main potential groups of allies: the investors and the consumers. Corporations were also 
viewed as potential allies, since the ODE executives felt that they were acting accordingly to 
the interests of those corporations and that they needed access to corporate information in 
order to perform an evaluation. 
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During the genesis of ARESE (1994-1997), Geneviève Férone conducted a market study 
in France and interviewed opinion leaders from the financial place in order to check the 
possibilities for implementing the translocal idea. The outcomes of that study were negative: 
SRI was perceived as too ideological and moral. However, the idea of quantification resorted 
at that stage as a way to reframe the project in accordance with the culture of French 
investors. With the help of her contacts in two French banks, Férone prepared a business plan 
focused on the methodological aspects of social and environmental evaluation. During that 
period she also participated to various think tank around Social Responsibility and Business 
Ethics and met people from the ODE, but considered that their reflections was of little help 
for her project. However, Geneviève Férone clearly perceived a lack of social and 
environmental information on financial market and the purpose of ARESE was to offer a tool 
providing quantified information to investors in order to allow them to invest in a socially 
responsible way. Corporations were also perceived from beneficiaries of such an approach 
since Férone also considered that "what is not quantified [by corporation] is not managed". 
Their cooperation to the rating process was also necessary to secure an access to raw data.    
According to Martial Cozette, CFIE’s founder, this organization wanted to provide 
information to any stakeholder who aims at changing companies' behavior. In order to do so, 
it proposes in-depth monographs on French companies. From the beginning, the use of 
quantification was completely rejected and presented as simplistic. Consequently, Martial 
Cozette defined his model as completely opposite to the Arese model. He explains that the 
more important is to get objective information, i.e. a global and in-depth qualitative 
knowledge of the real corporate behaviours. According to Martial Cozette:“to get objectivity, 
we have to separate both data collection and analysis from action. And the CFIE was created 
on this basis.” He also points out the fact that the CFIE is financially independent, so there is 
no conflict of interests with big companies. Towards the ODE, Martial Cozette is not so 
categorical. He explains that the CFIE and the ODE are similar in their conception of ethics 
but, according to him, the ODE gives less importance to companies. 
 
Thus, the different institutional entrepreneurs develop different problematization as they 
try to convince different groups and pursue different approaches. The diversity of those 




  16   XV
ème Conférence Internationale de Management Stratégique, Annecy / Genève 13-16 Juin 2006 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
The figure 2 illustrates the fact that problematization implies that each entrepreneurs 
realizes a work of self-definition as an obligatory passage point (OPP) between other entities 
(e.g. society, investors, corporations). That figure consequently shows the rivalry between the 
institutional entrepreneurs to interest specific entities to their own problem. The interesting 
system will be designed in order to secure the collaboration of these entities. 
 
 




The three organizations potentially provided some forms of symbolic and/or material 
rewards for the allies potentially interested by the problems they planed to solve.  
For the ODE, these rewards where oriented toward two of the mains corporate 
stakeholders perceived as leverages to fill the “ethical gap” of French corporations: 
consumers and investors. These actors were supposed to benefit from non-financial on 
corporate ethical behaviours that could reduce their search costs on those hazy issues. 
Subsequently, the adhesion to ODE program could allow these allies to contribute to the 
construction of a more ethical kind of management in France, an idea generating potentially 
strong symbolic rewards. 
In the ARESE case, rewards were framed according to a rational logic fitting with the 
promotion of so-called ‘business case’ argument on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
(Vogel, 2005). Indeed, the development of corporate social and environmental performance 
was always presented by that agency as a rational way to increase financial performance in 
the long run In the case of corporations, the benchmarks provided by ARESE rating appeared 
as a way to manage and increase corporate performance through a better quality of 
management of stakeholders. In the case of investors, ARESE data were presented as a way to 
invest more soundly informed. SRI was consequently sold as a mean to over-perform 
traditional forms of investment. Consequently, the ARESE project potentially provided 
legitimacy for people trying to develop CSR project inside corporations and/or SR products as 
well as a potentially increased financial performance. 
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Considering the CFIE, the potential rewards for targeted allies were similar to some 
extent to the one provided by the ODE. Through the construction of a more objective and in-
depth information, the CFIE offers itself as tool allowing NGO or other represent of the civil 
society to pursue their objective of targeting corporations at a low cost. Consequently, that 
approach was also integrating a promise of high symbolic reward, through the diffusion of a 
more socially aware way of doing business and ultimately the construction of an effective 
societal change. 
Table 3 summarizes the outcome of that stage, by providing the story used to attract 
allies as well as the potential rewards, both symbolic and material, that could be provided to 
entities deciding to adopt the program offered by each entrepreneur. 
 
 




The settled logic inherent to ‘problematization’ and the ‘interessement system’ gave 
birth to various artefacts embodying these principles and sustaining the previous stages of 
translation.  
In the ODE case, two main inscription devices  embodied its approach of social 
evaluation. Toward the consumers a Guide Ethique du Consommateur has been launched in 
2001 with the support of a well known publishing house, Albin Michel. That Guide was 
inspired by the book Shopping for a Better World which allegedly sold a million copies in the 
United States over a decade. It provided detailed information on 83 corporations and their 
associated brands in order to help consumers to choose products by taking into account 
‘ethical criteria’. The information of the guide is derived from a database designed to help 
fund managers to construct “customized” ethical portfolio. That second device, targeting 
financial investor, was presented in the French guide of societal analysis organizations 
(ORSE, 2001: 106-107) as based on quantified database detailing 10 criteria into more than 
100 subcategories allowing to construct a final score on 2000 points. The fund manager, 
during a discussion with the ODE’s staff, could choose to adjust the product to its own needs 
by deciding of the weights given to each criterion. 
The main core products commercialized by ARESE were all based on its quantified 
rating system (see Igalens & Gond, 2005 for a presentation), designed and adjusted to fit with 
financial investors expectations regarding quantification (Déjean et al. 2004). The 
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methodology used to rate corporations evolved over time, but its main principles, presented in 
various supports (e.g. Férone et al. 2001; ORSE, 2001: 57-59), consisted in using Total 
Quality Management models as well as a basic description of corporations’ main stakeholders 
and pre-existing secondary data to construct a quantified outcomes.  
The CFIE decided to act without taking into account the value and criteria of financial 
community. It refused to adapt its model to the demands of investors using quantitative data. 
It tried to persuade SR funds managers that qualitative data and dialogue was the best way to 
understand companies’ behaviors. And its goal was to convince progressively traditional 
investors that this model could be an alternative answer. It publishes a professional letter 
« Impact Entreprises » which potential audience is large: companies, investors, NGOs, trade 
unions. 
 
Table 4 presents the main inscription devices constructed by each entrepreneur to 
translate its initial problematization into action. These artefacts could contribute to generate 
actually the various rewards, securing the support of allies. 
 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
Support of allies 
The three organizations succeed unequally to secure the support of their potential allies. 
Such a fact resorted clearly from data collected on groups such as Media. For illustration 
whereas more than 100 newspaper reports mentioned the organization ARESE between 1997 
and the 12 of December 2001, only 3 articles mentioned and 5 for both the ODE and its 
closely linked association, the Cercle Ethique des Affaires. 
Only two SR funds seem to have subscribed the ODE’s offer. The ARRIA is a religious 
mutual fund which aggregate 500 congregations. The UK ethical screener EIRIS takes the 
ODE as its correspondent in France. Pierre Cadet uses his persona land religious networks to 
gain clients and access to companies. According to a former executive: "the network was the 
old French aristocracy, catholic and conservative”. Yet the support of allies remains limited. 
During a systematic interview campaign with almost all the French SR funds managers, 
virtually none of them mention spontaneously the ODE as potential data provider. Moreover, 
when asked about this organization, several SR funds managers acknowledged that they did 
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not know it. On the consumer side, despite some press releases, the Guide is not a success. 
Consumers associations are sceptical. They criticise a vision that is "almost always positive" 
of companies (Commenne and Van Zuylen, 2002: 28). 
ARESE appears retrospectively as an institutional success. Its rating system has been 
widely bought by SR funds managers and ARESE benefited from the increasing number of 
SR funds between 1997 and 2001. During that period, the number of SR funds in France grew 
from 7 to more than 80 in 2002. ARESE has maintained a position of leader on that emerging 
market.  Nearly 86% of the funds used the data from that provider in 2001. Beyond the 
support of investors, ARESE also benefited from an indirect support of big French 
corporations. According to the analysts, rated corporations progressively accepted to provide 
more and more qualitative information on their stakeholder management. During that period, 
ARESE adjusted and/changed several times both the methodology and the presentation style 
of its data in order to better stick investors expectations and to benefit from the newly 
accessible qualitative data. That position has also been comforted by the intensive networking 
work of Geneviève Férone realized during conferences and social events organized around 
CSR, sustainable development and/or SRI.  
According to Martial Cozette, most of the readers of the “Impact Entreprises” newsletter 
are managers. In some cases, the CFIE leads press campaign against some companies. In 
2002, they denounce the Pinault Printemps Redoute Group for its working methods.  But this 
campaign didn’t gain the support of media. According to Martial Cozette, Le Monde rejected 
the discourse of CFIE, denouncing a lack of professionalism. At the beginning of their 
activity, it seems that the CFIE tried to work with Arese and the ODE. The attempt to 
cooperate was a failure. As Martial Cozette states: “we have met together some times but it 
didn’t work. It is very difficult to form an alliance in this field”. The interessement systems 
developed by the CFIE toward financial professional was quiet unsuccessful. The associative 
status gave an impression of weak legitimacy. In the opinion of companies, the lack of capital 
and funds was synonymous of weak professionalism. Nevertheless, the CFIE developed an 
effective partnership network with specific organizations. In particular, they took part in the 
collective « Ethique sur étiquette » and in the association "Agir" and they usually worked to 
promote the label Max Havelaar. The CFIE’s strategy was to extend its activity through a 
diversified network. The role of the Director, Martial Cozette, is crucial. For instance, he gave 
some classes about ethics in business school which enlarged the audience of the CFIE. 
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The level of consent obtained by the three entrepreneurs from their potential allies is 
highly variable, as shown on table 5. That consent reflects a differentiated work of 
negotiation. Investors and corporations have been more inclined to follow ARESE logic 
thanks to a permanent reworking of the rating methodology. The CFIE did not succeed in its 
attempt to secure alliances: its program only interested few investors and its tool has not been 
used by NGOs or associations to promote the expected societal changes. According to the 
empirical data, the ODE program also failed to secure strong support from potential allies, 
outside the small world of French religious investors. These trends will be reinforced during 
the stage of network stabilization. 
 
 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
Stabilization of the network 
The ODE failed to stabilize its network. While religious funds kept supporting it, this 
remained a limited market and the executives were unable to find new allies. There was no 
negotiation to re-define the aims or the devices. Consequently, that organization only 
contributed to the identity construction of a very narrow range of actors on the market and has 
not played the role of a spokesperson for newly created field of social evaluation.  
ARESE acquired progressively a central place in the field, thank to the support of media 
and to its rating tool, which contributed to the construction of new identities both on the 
corporate and on the investor side. On the corporate side, ARESE data have been used by 
many corporations to communicate about their social and environmental performance in their 
institutional reports (Déjean, 2004). Here ARESE appeared as a translator ‘speaking’ for 
corporate engagement toward social responsibility. Moreover, a function of ‘sustainable 
development manager’ has emerged in rated corporations during that period, extending the 
work of translation started by ARESE. The role of these managers consisted mainly in finding 
the information related to the questions asked by organization like ARESE. Some 
corporations also used ARESE questionnaires to construct their reporting system. On the 
investor side, an identity of ‘non-financial’ analyst and of ‘socially responsible investors’ 
progressively emerged on the market, and the use of quantified rating system was perceived 
as a sign of professionalism by these new managers. Most of them defined and presented their 
work by mentioning ARESE at some stage. In conferences on SRI, ARESE analysts were 
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very often invited to speak in the name of the SRI industry or to present the work realized by 
a social rating organization. In few years, ARESE thus managed to become actually an 
obligatory passage point, between corporations and (socially responsible) investors. Its name 
was systematically quoted when the social evaluation and on the SRI topics were evoked. 
In the case of the CFIE, little mobilization of allies occurred. For instance, the CFIE 
gained the support of some media, but it remained difficulty relayed beyond. Monthly, 
Martial Cozette has a comment column in the magazine “Alternative Economiques”, but that 
engaged economics magazine is not much read by corporate managers neither financial 
investors. Besides, the CFIE is a member of some important boards as the French Social 
Investment Forum (SIF). Finally, the mobilization of allies consists of a loosely network of 
spare organizations. While the large network provided the CFIE with some legitimacy as it 
widely recognized, its lack of central position never allowed it to serve links between actors.  
Moreover, the CFIE has not been used as a "voice" by others actors and that organization 
failed to secure the level of legitimacy necessary to speak in the name of the social evaluation 
field as a whole. The CFIE had not contributed to frame stabilized identities of financial 
and/or corporate actors in the same way ARESE did. Some of the potential allies of CFIE 
dismissed its use as a tool to change corporations. The ODE similarly failed to enact the 
figure of ethical consumer though its guide and obtained a limited support on the financial 
place.  
 
The table 6 presents finally the outcomes of that last stage of the work translation 
realized by the three entrepreneurs. 
 
 





The purpose of this research was to provide a comparative study of three institutional 
entrepreneurs, and to develop a framework that could account for the articulation of the 
discursive and the material dimension in the institutional entrepreneurship process. To do so, 
we combined new institutionalism with the sociology of translation to develop an integrative 
framework accounting for both dimensions (model presented in Figure 1). In this section, we 
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build on the case study outcomes in order to address our research questions. We draw from 
this discussion propositions and avenues of research.  
Does the way institutional entrepreneurs articulate the discursive and material 
dimensions accounts for the institutionalization of their project? 
 
The discursive approach of translation insists on the need to translate the institutions 
according to the frames and logics dominant in the focal field to maximize diffusion and the 
development of a large coalition. This exercise was performed by all the three institutional 
entrepreneurs in the present case. The CFIE adapted the initial model to fit the frames and 
expectations of the French left wing NGOs and associations. The ODE adapted its own to a 
rather Christian and conservative view of ethics. Finally, ARESE adapted a model that could 
not be translated as such to the logics and frames of the financial markets. Hence, all the three 
performed some form of transformation of the initial model to align it on some frames 
existing in the focal field. Hence, they all received the support of allies. Yet, only one of them 
set a standard and stabilized its network in a sustainable way. We suggest this is due to 
differences in articulation between the discursive and the material dimensions of their 
strategies and to the diffusion of the material supports of their strategies – i.e. the inscription 
devices. 
The diffusion of the ODE’s inscription devices was a failure. The Guide was difficult to 
use and the reward system it offered did not resonate with consumers’ associations logics that 
are much more critical toward companies. While demanding such a guide, those associations 
wanted a more critical tool. The ODE provided synthetic notes based on a methodology which 
was either presented as qualitative, quantitative or a mix of both and was never made public. 
Important differences can be found between public presentations of this methodology and 
what former analysts from this association say it when interviewed. Overall, the ODE is 
considered as lacking professionalism by interviewed SR funds managers. 
ARESE’s ratings were designed according to their customers’ current practices. The 
form it took, using spreadsheet files, and the way it was labeled imitated the existing financial 
tools used by fund managers. ARESE organized regular presentations of its system which was 
regarded as very professional by many fund managers.  
The CFIE’s devices are acknowledged for their quality by the actors who had the 
opportunity to use them. Yet, those monographs could hardly be used within the financial 
decision making process which is mainly quantitative. Martial Cozette is well aware of this 
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problem and suggests that fund managers should change their decision making process. 
Hence, instead of providing a tool that would adapt to the current practices of the potential 
allies, this institutional entrepreneur suggests that those potential allies change their practices. 
While this appears to be very coherent with the CFIE’s problematization it limited the 
diffusion of its inscription device. 
 
This suggests that the institutionalization of the inscription device is favored by two 
dimensions that are reciprocally intertwined. First, the perception of the device as 
professional – i.e. serious and reliable seems to be important to ensure its institutionalization. 
Among fund managers, the ODE’s devices were viewed as lacking such professionalism 
which constituted a strong impediment to a wider adoption. A critic that none of ARESE and 
the ODE had to face. Second the perception of the device as coherent with the potential allies 
existing practices. The CFIE’s device is not criticized for its lack of professionalism but rather 
for its obvious, and assumed, contradiction with the existing practices within the financial 
community. One the opposite, ARESE evaluation was designed to fit into the existing 
financial decision making process. The social evaluation was presented in order to resemble 
the existing financial evaluation so that both could be combined. Its method would also draw 
from TQM, a well accepted way to evaluate in corporations. 
 
P.1. The more the inscription device is viewed as professional, and coherent with the 
potential allies current practices, the easier its institutionalization 
 
Another dimension emphasized by this case study is the influence of the inscription 
device on the definition by the potential allies of their identity. 
The ODE and the CFIE offer services that are of some interest for their potential allies. 
Yet, none of these services have an influence on the identity of those allies. Christian ethical 
funds or NGOs do not need those social evaluations to exist and function. The tools provided 
by the CFIE and the ODE help them to gain information that might otherwise be more 
difficult to track. 
ARESE’s case is different. The company started with a negative business plan. 
Although fund managers willing to develop such an activity existed they had no support and 
lacked legitimacy toward their superiors. One key reason was the lack of a professional tool 
that would articulate with their existing practices and allow them to obtain systematic extra 
financial information on companies in which they were likely to invest. ARESE provided a 
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tool which form was very close to any financial tool. ARESE’s device provided these actors 
with legitimacy and furthermore helped them build a specific identity. In 2001, 80% of all the 
French SR funds were managed with ARESE’s evaluations. Yet, for newcomers using 
ARESE was the first thing to do when starting an ethical fund. ARESE’s evaluation system 
made the activity of SR fund manager possible and contributed to the shaping of a common 
identity among those performing this activity. Eventually, using ARESE’s evaluation became 
a proof of the belonging to this group. This notation also gave legitimacy to sustainable 
development managers in companies. While they had been for long considered as costly they 
had an argument to indicate that they might eventually have a positive effect on the 
company’s stock price. 
Here there is a clear difference between the three devices. While the ODE and CFIE’s 
ones are potentially useful for allies, ARESE’s one helps those allies to gain legitimacy and to 
build an identity. 
 
P.2. The more the inscription device contributes to build the legitimacy and the 
identity of the potential allies, the easier its institutionalization. 
 
Does the way institutional entrepreneurs articulate the discursive and material 
dimensions accounts for the improvement of their positions? 
 
While the sociology of translation argues that the entrepreneur must renders itself 
indispensable and become an obligatory passage point, it does not say much on the strategies 
used to do so. Callon (1986b: 26) only specifies that the spectrum of methods ranges from 
seduction to pure violence by way of simple bargaining. The integrative framework and the 
empirical research allow distinguishing more clearly how the discursive and the material 
dimensions participate to the improvement of the institutional entrepreneur’s situation. 
First, the diffusion of the inscription device favors the establishment of the institutional 
entrepreneur as an obligatory passage point. The device as a material embodiment of the 
project ‘speaks’ for the institutional entrepreneur, bringing new allies who will consent to it. 
While the institutional entrepreneur remains relatively static, the device can travel and 
diffuses while remaining stable. The adoption of the device leads to a path dependency. In the 
case of ARESE, fund managers get used to the ARESE evaluation system and some change 
would implies sunk costs linked to the abandon of their know how with this system and the 
training with another one. As the institutional entrepreneur controls the device, they are 
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dependent on it. As the institutional entrepreneur controls the devices its influence expand 
with the diffusion of the device. 
 
P.3. The more the device is diffused and create a path dependency for users, the more 
the institutional entrepreneur that controls it will be an obligatory passage point. 
 
Second, as the device diffuses it develops the reputation and legitimacy of the 
entrepreneur. As the device embodies the project it diffuses the discourse of the entrepreneur. 
As such when this device is widely diffused, so is the discourse. When the device participates 
to the construction of the legitimacy and the identity of a community, it sets the institutional 
entrepreneur as a natural spokesperson for this community.   
While the CFIE and the ODE both had a message they wanted to diffuse and expected to 
be spokespersons for a community, the reduced diffusion of their devices limited their 
capacities to act legitimately as spokespersons.  
ARESE developed a coalition where it is central as its device is necessary to ensure the 
legitimacy and identity of its allies and eventually became a spokesman for the coalition. 
ARESE ‘spoke’ for SR fund managers in front of their superiors, arguing a positive 
relationship between social and financial performance and providing quantified data that 
would correspond to those use in the financial field. In conferences on SRI, ARESE CEO 
would be invited to speak in the name of this industry. ARESE ‘spoke’ for sustainable 
development managers to their superiors in corporations showing that their function could 
have an effect on the corporation’s financial performance on the stock market.  
 
P.4. The more the device is diffused within the community, the more the institutional 




In this paper we argue that in order to advance our understanding of the reasons why 
institutional entrepreneurs succeed or fail it is necessary to consider both the discursive and 
material dimension of the institutional entrepreneurship process.  
To build an integrative framework that would account for both dimensions we draw 
from previous works on translation. We use this framework to conduct a comparative analysis 
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between success and failure of three competing institutional entrepreneurs in an emerging 
field. Indeed, no such comparative study had yet been done.  
Firstly, the articulation of discursive and material dimension enriches the models of 
institutional entrepreneurship. Tracking the process and the articulation between those two 
dimensions in the institutional entrepreneurs strategies provide some important insights on the 
reasons for success and failure of institutional entrepreneurs. In particular it indicates that 
purely discursive strategies are not enough and that this dimension should be strategically 
articulated with the material one by the institutional entrepreneur in order to succeed.  
Secondly, this research is also a methodological contribution to the institutional 
literature which is characterized by a lack of comparative analyses between institutional 
entrepreneurs. In this study we compared three different cases of competing institutional 
entrepreneurs, whose translation strategies are distinct in the same field. Comparison reduces 
the under-sampling of failing institutional entrepreneurs which is common in the research on 
institutional entrepreneurship so far. This comparative study allows us to better specify the 
reasons for the success or the failures of competing institutional entrepreneurs in the same 
setting. We suggest that more comparative studies must be developed in order to foster our 
knowledge of institutional entrepreneurship. 
Yet, while developing new tools, this paper calls for further researches. Firstly, the 
present research has only examined the action of institutional entrepreneurs in one emerging 
field. Thus, the pursuit of the research would now require a replication in another emerging 
field to reinforce the external validity of our model and favour generalization. Second, 
comparative studies are necessary in other kinds of fields, such as the fragmented (D’Aunno, 
Succi, & Alexander, 2000) or turbulent (Farjoun, 2002) fields are also necessary. 
Overall, bringing the material dimension in and developing more comparative studies 
appear to be crucial to advance our knowledge on institutional entrepreneurship. 
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Annexe 1.  Self presentation of the three organizations in the French “Guide of Societal Analysis 
Organisms” (ORSE, 2001) 
 
Organization  ARESE (pp. 57-59*)  
 





ARESE S.A. (Agence de 
Rating Social et 
Environnemental sur les 
Entreprises) was founded in 
1997 by Geneviève Férone, 
with the support of the Caisse 
des Dépôts et Consignations 
and the Caisse d’Epargne 
Group. ARESE launched on 
June 28, 2001 the first 
European stock exchange 
index on sustainable 
development, the “ASPI 
Eurozone” 
 
The Centre Français 
d’Information sur les 
Entreprises (CFIE) is a not 
for profit association 
founded in march 1996 by 
people with diverse 
professional backgrounds 
and people from the 
associative world. The CFIE 
does not evaluate but provide 
documented in depth 
analysis of social, 
environmental, and human 
policies and performances of 
companies 
The Observatoire Ethique des 
Entreprises was since 1997 
the name of the Cercle 
Ethique des Affaires 
association’s analysis 
department. It became 
independent in order to 
separate the consulting 
activities of the Cercle 
Ethique des Affaires from 
those of analysis which it was 
in charge of 
Main 
partnerships 
 Funding member of the SiRi 
Group. In charge of research 
on French and Portuguese 
companies 
 Created the CER2D 
(European Research Center 
on Sustainable 
Development) 
 ARESE launched its index 
family ASPI with STOXX 
(a world leader in stock 
index calculation and stock 
markets) 
 
When studying MNCs or 
analyze companies listed in 
foreign stock markets, The 
CFIE cooperates with 
organizations such as Clean 
Clothes Campaign, the 
International Union for the 
Conservation of Nature or 
ARESE 
 The ODE is a member of 
Global Partners for 
Corporate Responsibility 
 The ODE provides 
information on French 




Core business  
  Sectoral notations in 
European universes and 
values tracking 
  Sectoral expertises on 
sustainable development 
  Specific benchmarks (by 
criteria, sector, country) 
  Detailed studies 
(identification of 
performance indexes, 
internal management tools) 
Customized services 
  Venture capital, small caps, 
public companies 
  Public offerings for stock 
and obligations markets 
(countries and private 
companies) 
  Test and validation of     
management models 
oriented toward sustainable 
development 
 
  Impact Entreprises a 
two-monthly information 
letter on citizenship and 
the companies. It provides 
12 pages of analysis on 
social and environmental 
strategies developed by 
French and foreign 
companies. 
  Sectoral and thematic 
studies: the CFIE realizes 
sectoral and thematic 
studies on subjects such as 
working conditions in 
emerging countries, the 
sport apparel industry, the 
petrol or wood industries. 
  Organization of working 
meetings: on issues such 
as corporate social and 
environmental 
responsibility 
 The ‘Guide Ethique du 
Consommateur’: this book 
published in 2001 analyzes 
700 brands […] accounting 
for 80% of a French 
household’s average buys 
through environmental, 
social practices… 
 A service to create and 
analyze portfolio. This 
service manages the 
creation of portfolios 
according to client’s 
criteria, providing either 
notations or profiles. 
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* quoted pages in ORSE (2001) 
 
Organization  ARESE (pp. 57-59*)  
 
CFIE (pp. 72-73*)  ODE (pp. 106-108*) 
Clients 
 
In 2001, ARESE has 29 
clients in Europe including 
AXA, the Caisse des Dépôts, 
the Caisses d’Epargne, the 
Credit Lyonnais, DEXIA, 
HSBC, Lazard Brothers, the 
Société Générale and UBP. 
Overall 36 ethical funds use 
ARESE’s analysis and rating. 
ARESE clients manage a 
total amount of more than 1,6 
billion euros 
The CFIE’s clients are 
mainly financial investors as 
well as French and foreign 
associations.  
Amount of funds managed 
with information provided by 
this organization: Non 
Available 
Among ODE clients are: 
EIRIS, the Financila Times 
for which the ODE realize 
analysis of French companies 
being in databases, ARRIA 
(3 ethical funds), Financière 
d’UZES, CCF, etc. 
The amount of funds 
managed using information 
provided by the ODE is 
estimated to 120 millions 
euros for direct clients and 
several hundreds millions 
euros for databases 
 
* quoted pages in ORSE (2001) 
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TABLE 1. Decontextualizing foreign practices 
  ODE 
 




CEP (US), EIRIS (UK) 
 









change by providing 
information to public 
 
Performing corporate 




change through faith and 
proxy research 
 
Translocal idea  Increasing "ethical 
awareness" of 
corporations by providing 
information on their 
behaviour to various 
stakeholders 
Idea to provide social and 
environmental 
information to investors 
on financial markets 
Providing an overall 
evaluation of the 
corporation to be used by 
stakeholders and civil 
society in order to 
promote social and 
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France is late on the issue 
of ethics in management 
and companies need to be 
helped to be more ethical 
 
There is (potentially) a 
need on the financial 
place for non-financial 
information on corporate 
behaviour that could help 
both investors and 
corporations 
 
There is a unbalanced 
power relationship 
between business and the 
civil society and we 
should help the last one 








Narrow range: investors 
and corporations 
 
Broad range: civil 
society, non corporate 
stakeholders 
 
Setting a logic  Providing independently 
"neutral" tools that would 
help various groups to 
select corporations based 
on their ethical behaviour 
Providing quantified non-
financial information 
through a managerial 
methodology inspired by 
total quality management 
in order to fit with 
investors expectations 




a detailed, in-depth and 
accurate information 
about corporate practices 
and misconducts in order 
to help non corporate 
stakeholders (e.g. NGO) 
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Telling a good story 
 
Filling the ‘ethical gap’ of 
French corporations by 
acting in a more ethical 
way 
 
Obtaining an increased 
financial performance 




Revealing the reality of 
corporate behaviour 
through an ‘objective’ 
and global information 
 
Reward systems 
[M = Material aspects] 
 
[M] Reduce the search 
costs for both consumers 
and investors by 
providing directly the 
information on corporate 
behaviour, allowing them 
to realize their choice in a 
more ethical way 
 




products (for investors); 
Using the rating to 




[M] Reduce the search 
costs for activists and 
investors by providing the 
information and 
consequently help them to 
promote social change 
 
Reward systems 
[S = symbolic aspects] 
[S] Being perceived as an 
ethically and socially  
aware customer; 
Contributing to construct 
the ethical awareness of 
corporations for investors 
and consumers 
 
[S] Obtaining legitimacy 
toward their public (for 
shareholders and socially 
responsible fund 
managers and sustainable 
development managers in 
corporations) 
 
[S] Contributing to 
promote social change 
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TABLE 4. Embodying approaches in ‘inscription devices’ 
  ODE 
 
ARESE CFIE 
Main inscription devices  “Guide Ethique du 
Consommateur” (2001) 
 
“Customized” analysis of 
corporations based on 
quantified data to 
construct ethical  
portfolio (since 2001) 
Social Ratings based on a 
standardized and 
quantified data analysis of 
main companies using 
management quality 
methods and presented in 
order to fit into the 
financial analysts’ 
decision making process 
(since 1997, rating 
available for more than 
300 corporations in 2001) 
 
Detailed monographs on 
companies (started in 
1996, 30  available 
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sceptical toward the 
Guide 





 Numerous ethical 
investors / socially 
responsible fund 
managers buy the 
rating to construct 
their product 
 Corporations provide 
information to ARESE 
 GF manage to be part 
of top executive circle 
 GF is often speaking in 
the newspapers about 
her agency 
 
 Few investors used the 
data 
 Support and 
relationships with 
some NGOs, e.g. 
“Agir”, RITMO, Al-
CSRR, “Ethique sur 
l’étiquette” 









No information about any 
attempts to redefine 
and/or to refine the 
methodology in order to 
obtain new allies' support 
Permanent redefinition of 
the input (data collection 
process) and the output 
(social rating 
presentation) of the 
inscription device to 
better fit expectations 




Attempt to secure 
relationships through 
alliances with others 
actors from the field 
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TABLE 6. Stabilizing the network 




[playing the role of 
and/or being used by 
other actors to speak in 
their name] 
 
Not considered as an 
entity speaking in the 
name of the industry 




ARESE members often 
invited by journalists to 
speak in the name of SRI 
or social rating activity 
ARESE speaking to 
corporate executives in 
the name of investors 
 
Column in a monthly 
engaged Magazine 
missing partially central 





Contribution to the 
reinforcement of identity 
only on the narrow 





Strong influence on 
‘socially responsible’ 
identities construction in 
the investor field 
Contribution to identity 
construction in 
corporations 
Weak influence on 
identity construction of 
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 Identification and disembodiment 
of a model from its local carriers 
 Interpretation and transformation 
of the model into a translocal idea  Translocal idea 
[2] Problematization 
 
Define a problem and explain 
why this is the only solution 
 Setting a logic 
 Solving concrete problem 
[3] Interessement systems 
 
Systems aimed at convincing 
other actors to cooperate  
 Tell a good story 
 Reward system 
[4] Embodiment 
 
Construction of inscription 
devices embodying 
problematization and the 
interessement system 
[5] Support of allies 
 
 Conformity or consent 
 Potential negotiation of [2]; 
[3] and/or [4] 
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  40 
Civil society   Consumers  Investors  Corporations  NGO  Labor unions 
ODE / OPP 
What information will help 
corporate stakeholders and 
society to increase corporate 
ethics?  
ARESE / OPP 
What information will help 
investors (and corporations) 
to integrate CSR in their 
decision?  
CFIE / OPP 
What information will allow 
society and non corporate 
stakeholders to change the 
way business is done? 
 Providing quantified extra-
financial information through a 
managerial methodology 
inspired by total quality 
management in order to fit with 
investors expectations and help 
corporation to progress 
Providing independently 
"neutral" tools that would help 
various groups to select 
corporations based on their 
ethical behaviour and 
consequently increased 
corporations' ethics 
 Providing independently a 
detailed, in-depth and accurate 
information about corporate 
practices and misconducts in 
order to help non corporate 
stakeholders (e.g. NGO) to 
change corporate behaviors 
Obtaining increased 
financial performance 
through social and 
performance 
Filling the 'ethical gap' of 
French corporations by 
acting in a more ethical way 
Revealing the reality of 
corporate behaviour through 
an objective and global 
information 



































































































FIGURE 2. Problematization as the construction of an Obligatory Passage Point (OPP) 